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Click on cases noted
with
details coming soon The Hitchin' Post and Section 1983 Can a prisoner sue state prison officials for violating his civil rights--here, subjecting him to the seemingly cruel and unusual punishment of being shackled to a hitching post (not to mention the accompanying "prolonged thirst and taunting")--if the officials didn't know their conduct was illegal? Court precedent says no, so the Justices considered this: did the fellows in charge have warning, under law, to know this particular disciplinary method is off limits? Six justices sided with the Bush administration and ruled you bet: y'all should have known better. Thomas, joined by Scalia and Rehnquist, says not so fast. The "petitioner’s specific allegations against respondents" is far from obvious. "What is 'obvious,' however, is that the Court’s explanation of how respondents violated the Eighth Amendment is woefully incomplete." Click here for Hope v Peltzer; click here for the SG's brief
Lapides v. Board of Regents of Georgia No. 01-298
City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service No. 01-419 Are State Patient
Protection HMO Laws Preempted by Federal Statute?
Surf's up, but
Beware the Secondary Effects of those Bikinis
The Supremes remind that deference to the 9th Circuit is not unbounded, either. O'Connor, writing for a 5-4 Court, upheld the Los Angeles ordinance because it (1) is content neutral, (2) the city, in passing a content neutral regulation, need only show a link between suspect activity and harmful secondary effects--"it does not bear the burden of providing evidence that rules out every (other) theory." According to O'Connor, local experimentation should be respected: "municipalities will, in general, have greater experience with and understanding of the secondary effects that follow certain protected speech than will the courts." This may be the best the Court can do under the circumstances--Justice
Kennedy, earlier this term, praised the themes animating "American
Beauty" and "Traffic" (Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coalition)--but there is a more compelling
option on the table. As Scalia states in his concurrence, "the
Constitution does not prevent those communities that wish to do so from
regulating, or indeed entirely suppressing, the business of pandering sex."
The First Amendment is not at risk when communities regulate conduct, or at
least conduct devoid of meaningful expression.
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