Statement of Purpose

Environmental regulation is more centralized and rigid than perhaps any other type of regulation.  Centralization is variously defended as a way of coping with the “complexity” of environmental problems; as a means of redressing cross-boundary pollution; or as a way of preventing a “race to the (environmental) bottom.”  These rationalizations, however, lack plausibility.  Centralized environmental controls are best understood as an accommodation to interest group pressures.

Sensible environmental regulation should start with a simple question:  is there any reason to believe that state or local jurisdictions will undervalue environmental benefits and amenities?  The books and articles listed below criticize the ostensible justifications for centralized environmental controls and explore options for a more variegated, flexible, federal system of regulation.

• Friends of the Earth, Foes of Federalism by Michael Greve. Duke Environmental  Law and Policy Forum, Vol. 12 (Fall 2001).
• The Demise of Environmentalism in American Law by Michael Greve (AEI Press).
• Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Normative Critique by Richard Revesz, from The New Federalism: Can the States be Trusted? (John Ferejohn and Barry Weingast eds., 1997) (coming soon)
• Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race to the Bottom' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation by Richard Revesz, 67 New York University Law Review 1210, 1992.
• Using Federalism to Improve Environmental Policy by Henry Butler and Jonathan Macey (AEI Press).