Statement of Purpose

Environmental regulation is more centralized and rigid than perhaps any other type of regulation.� Centralization is variously defended as a way of coping with the �complexity� of environmental problems; as a means of redressing cross-boundary pollution; or as a way of preventing a �race to the (environmental) bottom.�� These rationalizations, however, lack plausibility.� Centralized environmental controls are best understood as an accommodation to interest group pressures.

Sensible environmental regulation should start with a simple question:� is there any reason to believe that state or local jurisdictions will undervalue environmental benefits and amenities?� The books and articles listed below criticize the ostensible justifications for centralized environmental controls and explore options for a more variegated, flexible, federal system of regulation.

• Friends of the Earth, Foes of Federalism�by Michael Greve. Duke Environmental� Law and Policy Forum, Vol. 12 (Fall 2001).
• The Demise of Environmentalism in American Law by Michael Greve (AEI Press).
• Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Normative Critique by Richard Revesz, from The New Federalism: Can the States be Trusted? (John Ferejohn and Barry Weingast eds., 1997) (coming soon)
• Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race to the Bottom' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation by Richard Revesz, 67 New York University Law Review 1210, 1992.
• Using Federalism to Improve Environmental Policy by Henry Butler and Jonathan Macey (AEI Press).